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ness" to which every property owner is constitutionally entitled. The increasing awareness within the legal community of the critical problems of urban
housing and the continuing modification of the landlord and tenant relationship make it apparent that the constitutional validity of detainer statutes will
again meet judicial scrutiny.
GRANVILLE CHEVELEY BURGESS

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: STATE APPORTIONMENT- A STILL
EMERGING STANDARD FOR EQUAL PROTECTION
Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315 (1973)
The 1971 Virginia General Assembly, pursuant to the Virginia constitution,' enacted statutes redistricting the state for election of members to its
House of Delegates 2 and Senate.8 Suits 4 were brought in federal district court5
by Virginia citizens alleging that the House apportionment plan violated the
equal protection requirements of the "one person-one vote" doctrine. 6 The
district court held the population variances among the districts of the House
plan 7 constitutionally impermissible: although the variances were traceable to
1. The Virginia constitution provides for the reapportionment of the Commonwealth's
electoral districts based solely on population every ten years. VA. CoNsT. art. H, §6.
2. VA. CODE ANN. §24.1-12.1 (Supp. 1972).

3. Id. §24.1-14.1.
4. Two suits were brought in addition to the one challenging the population variances
in the House of Delegates plan. One, challenging the use of multi-member districts in the
House plan, was subsequently withdrawn. Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 317 n.4 (1973). The
Senate redistricting statute was challenged in another suit, decided with the instant case,
which alleged that the City of Norfolk was unconstitutionally split into three districts, allocating Navy personnel home-ported in Norfolk to one district and isolating Negro voters
in another. The United States Supreme Court affirmed the federal district court's solution of
establishing one multi-member district for the three districts involved. Id. at 330-33.
5. "Three three-judge district courts were convened to hear the suits pursuant to 28
U.S.C. §§2281 and 2284. The suits were consolidated and heard by the four judges who
made up the three three-judge panels." 410 U.S. at 318.
6. The doctrine is based upon the premise that the right to vote is so fundamental in
our democratic society that its dilution is as improper as denying it altogether. Thus, once
a state has determined voting districts, all who participate must have an equal vote. Reynolds
v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555, 567-68 (1964); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 379-80 (1963); Baker
v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 242-45 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring).
7. "The statute apportioning the House provided for a combination of 52 singlemember,
multimember and floater delegate districts from which 100 delegates would be elected. As
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a desire to follow political subdivision lines, Virginia had failed to demonstrate
a governmental necessity for strictly adhering to such lines.8 The district court
enjoined elections and redistricted the state.9 On appeal, the United States
Supreme Court 0 reversed and HELD, that Virginia's rational state interest in
maintaining the integrity of political subdivision lines justified the population
variances. 1
Over the last decade, the United States Supreme Court has been active in
the solution of congressional,12 state,13 and local14 apportionment controversies.
The landmark case of Baker v. Carr'5 resolved the procedural barriers to apportionment litigation 16 and suggested its possible equal protection foundation.17 However, in Wesberry v. Sanders,1s the first case to reach the Supreme
Court in the wake of Baker, the Court relied not on the fourteenth amendment Equal Protection Clause, but on article I, section 2 of the Constitution 9

found by the lower court, the ideal district in Virginia consisted of 46,485 persons per
delegate, and the maximum percentage variation from that ideal under the Act was 16.40
- the 12th district being overrepresented by 6.8% and the 16th district being underrepresented by 9.6%. The population ratio between these two districts was 1.18 to 1. The average
percentage variance under the plan was ±E3.89%, and the minimum population percentage
necessary to elect a majority of the House was 49.29%." 410 U.S. at 318-19. "[Mlore than 25%
of the delegates would be elected from districts in which the population deviates from the
ideal by more than 5%. Almost 60% of the delegates would represent districts which deviate
by more than 3%. Four legislators would be elected from districts which are over- or underrepresented by more than 8%." Id. at 335 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
8. Howell v. Mahan, 330 F. Supp. 1138 (E.D. Va. 1971), re-'d, 410 U.S. 315 (1973).
9. Under the district court's plan the maximum deviation would be 7.2%. "The number
of delegates whose districts deviate from the norm by 3 or more percent would be almost
cut in half, from 58 to 32. And of the 32 districts still exceeding the 3% mark, only one
... would exceed the mean by more than 3.7%." 410 U.S. at 338-39 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
10. 28 U.S.C. §1253 (1970) authorizes direct appeal to the Supreme Court from an order
of a three-judge panel in a federal district court.
11. 410 U.S. at 329-30.
12. See, e.g., Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542 (1969); Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S.
526 (1969); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964); Comment, Congressional Reapportionment: The Theory of Representation in the House of Representatives, 39 TULANE L. REV.
286 (1965).
13. See, e.g., Connor v. Williams, 404 U.S. 594 (1972); Kilgarlin v. Hill, 386 U.S. 120
(1967); Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695 (1964); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Berman,
The Legislative Reapportionment Cases: A Study in the Development of Judicial Relief, 1970
LAW & SOCIAL ORDER 519.

14. Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182 (1971); Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968);
Dixon, Local Representation: Constitutional Mandates and Apportionment Options, 36 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 693 (1968).
15. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
16. Prior to Baker v. Carr, apportionment was considered a political question presenting no justiciable issue for the federal courts. See, e.g., Mathews v. Handley, 361 U.S. 127
(1959); Hartsfield v. Sloan, 357 U.S. 916 (1958); Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946); Lucas,
Legislative Apportionment and Representative Government: The Meaning of Baker v. Carr,
61 MICH. L. REv. 711 (1963).
17. 369 U.S. at 237, 244.
18. 376 U.S. 1 (1963).
19. "Representatives . . . be . .. chosen by the People of the Several States." U.S. CONST.
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to hold that as nearly as practicable congressional districts must be of equal
population.20 Shortly thereafter, in Reynolds v. Sims,21 the Supreme Court applied the Equal Protection Clause to apportionment of state legislative districts, again holding that as nearly as practicablesuch districts must be of equal
population. 2 Recognizing the implication that the equal population requirements of article I, section 2 and the Equal Protection Clause were almost
absolute, the Reynolds Court went on to consider "whether there are any
constitutionally cognizable principles which would justify departures from
basic standards of equality among voters." 23 While refusing to establish a
precise constitutional test, the Court did conclude that mathematical precision
is hardly possible, and absent any discrimination or arbitrariness, divergence
from strict population equality may be permissible, but only if the product
24
of a rational state policy.
Subsequent cases elucidicating the nearly as practicable standard 25 represented a search for constitutionally acceptable justifications for population
variances. A very strict standard emerged,2 6 requiring both good faith 27 and

art. I, §2.
20. Mr. Justice Black, speaking for the majority, concluded that the command of article
I, section 2 of the Constitution, "construed in its historical context ... means that as nearly
as is practicable one man's vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much as another's." 376 US. at 8. Mr. Justice Black's analysis of the history of the Constitution also
"reveals that ... it was population which was to be the basis of the House of Representatives." Id. at 8-9.
21. 877 U.S. 533 (1964).
22. The Court reasoned that whenever legislative apportionment allocates the same
number of representatives to an unequal number of constituents, the franchise of the constituents in the smaller district is diluted and debased in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 564-68.
23. Id. at 561.
24. Id. at 577-81.
25. Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971); Connor v. Johnson, 402 U.S. 690 (1971);
Kilgarlin v. Hill, 386 U.S. 120 (1967); Swann v. Adams, 885 U.S. 440 (1967); Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73 (1966); Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 483 (1965); Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen.
Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964); Roman v. Sincock, 877 U.S. 695 (1964).
26. The Supreme Court rejected any notion of a fixed de minimis exception because the
goal of apportionment should be to achieve absolute equality and not to come within a
predetermined acceptable range. Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 580-31 (1969). The
state has the affirmative burden of presenting constitutionally acceptable reasons for all
deviations from equality. Swann v. Adams, 385 U.S. 440, 443-44, 446 (1967). The fact that a
challenged plan was approved by the electorate is without constitutional significance if the
plan fails to satisfy the basic requirements of district equality. Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen.
Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 736 (1964).
A plan that is approved in one state has little bearing on the validity of a similar variation in another state. Swann v. Adams, 385 U.S. 440, 445 (1967); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S.
533, 578 (1964). Both houses of a bicameral legislature must be considered together. Maryland Comm. for Fair Representation v. Towers, 377 U.S. 656, 678 (1964).
27. If litigants could present to a court a plan evidencing greater equality among districts than the plan under attack, it was presumed that the attacked plan was not a goodfaith effort and thus unconstitutional. Swann v. Adams, 385 U.S. 440, 445 (1967); Note, Constitutional Law -Congressional Reapportionment-Equal Representation Requirement Re.
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mathematically precise 28 population equality. Although the Supreme Court
continued to adhere to the Reynolds principle that some population deviations
are permissible to promote a rational state interest, the Court never held con29
stitutional a congressional or state apportionment scheme on such grounds.
This is readily explained by the heavy burden of proof the Supreme Court
has required of a state to successfully maintain such justification. 0 Before a
court may even consider the Reynolds question of a justifying rational interest,
a state must demonstrate that its announced policy necessitates the range of
population deviation within its proposed plan.: The Supreme Court also held
this test applicable to congressional districting,2 2 but in the same holding rejected every state interest that has been, or possibly could be, advanced in
justification of population variances.33 However, this more stringent standard
was the result of the unique nature of congressional districting rather than the
specific constitutional command of article I, section 2.2Although Reynolds promised each citizen an equally effective voice in the
election of his legislative representatives," 5 the Supreme Court adhered to a

quires a Good Faith Effort To Achieve Absolute Equality, 15 VILL. L. REV. 223 (1969).
28. See cases collected in Annot., 12 L. Ed. 2d 1282-1305 (1964); Note, Mathematics and
the Art of Statecraft: The 1969 Reapportionment Cases, 3 LOYOLA U.L. REv. (L.A.) 475 (1970).
29. See, e.g., Kilgarlin v. Hill, 386 U.S. 120 (1967); Swann v. Adams, 885 U.S. 440 (1967);
Davis v. Mann, 877 U.S. 678 (1964). But see Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182 (1971), where a
Rockland County, New York, apportionment scheme with significant population variance
was held constitutional because of justifying state interests.
30. A state has the affirmative burden of presenting acceptable reasons for all variances
among the populations of state legislative districts. See, e.g., Swann v. Adams, 385 U.S. 440,
443-44, 446 (1967).
31. Kilgarlin v. Hill, 386 U.S. 120, 123 (1967). This requirement of necessity in state
legislative districting is consistent with the strict scrutiny equal protection test applied in
cases where fundamental rights, among which is the right to vote, are at issue. See, e.g.,
Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Shapiro
v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). The right to vote is not a constitutionally protected right
per se. Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1874). However, there is a "protected right, implicit
in our constitutional system, to participate in state elections on an equal basis with other
qualified voters whenever the State has adopted an elective process for determining who will
represent any segment of the State's population." San Antonio Independent School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
32. Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 894 U.S. 526, 532 (1969).
33. Among those considerations rejected by the Court were the representation of distinct
economic and social interests, practical political compromises, the integrity of political subdivisions and geographic compactness. Id. at 533-36.
34. The Supreme Court has, from the beginning, viewed congressional districting as
simply a voting issue and has rejected all plans that fail to treat each voter on an equal
basis. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7 (1964). See generally Weiss, An Analysis of Wesberry
v. Sanders, 38 So. CAL. L. RFv. 67 (1965). "[W]ith half of Congress apportioned on a nonpopulation basis, it is only proper that the other House should comply with a strict population equality standard." Note, Constitutional Law - CongressionalDistricting "One-Man OneVote" Demands Near Mathematical Precision, 19 Dz PAUL L. REv. 152, 167 (1969).
85. "[Rlepresentative government is in essence self-government through the medium of
elected representatives of the people, and each and every citizen has an inalienable right to
full and effective participation in the political processes of his State's legislative bodies."
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565 (1964).
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narrow, exacting standard of district population equality and was reluctant
to grant relief from the more subtle forms of structural misrepresentation.3 6
Such reluctance was apparent in the recent decision of Whitcomb v. Chavisy
where the Court declined to rescue an insular black minority from the constitutionally permissible burial it received in a multi-member district.38 Although the Court has expressed a preference for single-member districts, 39
multi-member districts are commonly employed and are constitutionally acceptable because they maintain precise mathematical equality. 40 The representational problem is that the winner-take-all aspect of multi-member district
elections tends to dilute the effectiveness of a minority group's vote within the
district.4 ' For example, in Whitcomb residents of a black ghetto area located
totally within a multi-member district demonstrated that while the ghetto area
constituted eighteen per cent of the district's population, less than five per cent
of the district's representatives were ghetto residents. 42 The Supreme Court

36. These include gerrymandering, multi-member districts, bloc voting, and the use of
strategic majorities and safe districts. Elliot, Prometheus, Proteus, Pandora, and Procrustes
Unbound: The Political Consequences of Reapportionment,37 U. Cm. L. Rxv. 474, 482 (1970).

37. 403 U.S. 124 (1971).
38. Multi-member districts are districts electing two or more representatives at large. In
Whitcomb, the multi-member district at issue was Marion County, Indiana, which elected 15
representatives and 8 senators to the state legislature. Id. at 128.
39. Connor v. Johnson, 402 U.S. 690, 692 (1971).
40. A district with twice the population of another would receive twice the number of
legislators. Multi-member districts are favored by apportioners because they can adjust for
changes in population by simply shifting the number of representatives assigned to each
district rather than going through the complicated and expensive process of redrawing district
lines.
41. Multi-member districts were also challenged on two theoretical grounds in Whitcomb.
First, by its nature the multi-member district gives voters in the larger districts an advantage over voters in smaller multi-member districts or single-member districts. By alloting
increasing numbers of legislators in direct proportion to the increase in the population of
the district, the courts assume that the voting power of both constitutents and legislators
varies inversely with the size of the district. However, in Whitcomb it was demonstrated
mathematically that voting power does not vary inversely with the size of the district, but
rather, varies inversely with the square root of the size of the district. Thus, to allot legislative seats in direct proportion to the increase in the population is to give voters-both constituents and legislators - in larger districts undue voting power by giving them more chances
to determine election and voting outcomes than voters in smaller multi-member or singlemember districts. Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 144-45 (1971). Second, the enhancement
of voting power was compounded further by the tendency of multi-member delegations to
vote in blocs, which tendency was alleged to be a function of at-large election of plural
representatives and the persuasive influence of the district's political structure. Id. at 146-47.
The Supreme Court did not quarrel with the above analysis, but required actual, rather than
theoretical, demonstration of the "real-life impact of multi-member districts on individual
voting power .... Id. at 146.
42. The district court also found that the ghetto area residents had characteristics and
interests that differed substantially from the non-ghetto area residents. The Marion County
delegation usually voted in a bloc, often reflecting only the interests of the majority voters.
If districted into single-member districts, the ghetto area would elect two or three representatives. Id. at 128-29, 133.
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reversed a favorable district court decision 43 and held that to contest the constitutionality of a multi-member district successfully a plaintiff must not only
prove that such districting does in fact discriminate, but also establish that
there was an invidious intent to discriminate. 44 This exacting burden of proof
was more stringent than that imposed in prior cases45 and is perhaps best explained by fears that entitling a minority group to such representation would
4
open the floodgates to litigation. 0
Interestingly, in the instant case, Virginia successfully propounded the
constitutionality of its proposed House of Delegates districting scheme with
an "effective representation" argument not unlike the arguments unsuccessfully
advanced in Whitcomb. Virginia contended the population variances of its
proposed House plan were within constitutional limits because they resulted
from an effort to give the state's political subdivisions an effective voice as
political subdivisions in one house of the General Assembly. 7 Thus, the state
argued, the subdivisions would be able to obtain favorable local legislation
from the General Assembly, which possessed extensive power over the organi4
zation and operation of the subdivisions.
The district court in the instant case, relying on two congressional districting cases,49 found Virginia's interest in effective representation for its political
subdivisions did not justify the degree of population variance among the districts of the proposed house plan and held the plan unconstitutional.o Although in the development of the nearly as practicable standard the two lines
of cases, congressional and state, were entwined and interdependent, on appeal
the Supreme Court seized upon their independent constitutional origins-' to

43. The district court redistricted the state completely into single-member districts. Chavis
v. Whitcomb, 307 F. Supp. 1362 (S.D. Ind. 1969). The 1971 Indiana General Assembly, undoubtedly compelled by the court's decision, redistricted and reapportioned the entire state
into single-member districts. IND. CODE §§2-1-1.2-1, -3 (1971). Since this districting was accomplished prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Whitcomb, the question of mootness
arose. At the urging of both parties, the Supreme Court decided the central issue of the
case: the validity of multi-member districts under the particular circumstances. Whitcomb

v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 140-41 (1971).
44. 403 U.S. at 149-53.
45. In two prior decisions, Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433 (1965), and Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73 (1966), intent was expressly considered not to be a requirement. In Fortson,
multi-member districts are invidiously discriminatory if it can be shown that such districts
"designedly or otherwise . . . would operate to minimize or cancel out the voting strength
of racial or political elements of the voting population." 379 U.S. at 439 (emphasis added).
In Burns, such districts "were subject to constitutional challenge only upon a demonstration
that [the scheme] ... was designed to or would operate to minimize or cancel out the voting
strength of racial or political elements of the voting population." 384 U.S. at 89 (emphasis
added).

46. See 403 U.S. at 156-57.
47. 410 U.S. at 323-24.
48. Id. at 323.
49. Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526 (1969) and Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542
(1969).
50. 330 F. Supp. 1138, 1140 (E.D. Va. 1971).
51. See notes 20 and 22 supra.
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establish a dichotomy between the two lines. 52 This dichotomy, the Court
held, indicated that the district court had employed an inappropriate constitutional standard, the stringent article I, section 2 standard for congressional
districting, to judge the constitutionality of the proposed House plan.5 3
The Court went on to assess the proposed House plan under what it held
to be the appropriate constitutional standard - the equal protection requirements of Reynolds v. Sims. 54 Finding sufficient authority for the rationality of
a state policy promoting subdivisional representation in its legislature,55 the
Court concentrated on Virginia's effectuation of this policy. It held that because: (1) Virginia had consistently sought to implement this policy; (2) the
House plan reasonably advanced this policy; and (3) the House plan did not
sacrifice substantial population equality, the population variances were within
Reynolds' constitutional limits and therefore the proposed House plan was
constitutional. 56
In his dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice Brennan noted the Court's failure to
57
consider several state apportionment cases decided subsequent to Reynolds.
These cases had tightened the rationality requirements of Reynolds to a standard similar to the congressional standard relied upon by the district court.58
In fact, the dissent found no material difference between the nearly as practicable standard for congressional apportionment and the same standard for state
apportionment. 59 Thus, the decision in the instant case went beyond the mere
application of the proper standard to a unique set of facts- the Court impliedly overruled established precedent and created a new nearly as Practicable
standard for apportionment of state legislative districts. 60
Assuming arguendo that the Reynolds' rational interest standard was the

52. 410 U.S. at 322.

53. "We conclude therefore that the constitutionality of Virginia's legislative redistricting plan was not to be judged by the more stringent standards . . . applicable to con-

gressional reapportionment." 410 U.S. at 324.
54. 377 U.S. 533 (1953); see 410 U.S. at 324-30.
55. The Court cited Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678 (1964). 410 U.S. at 325.

56. 410 U.S. at 328-30.
57. Id. at 342-43. These cases were Kilgarlin v. Hill, 386 U.S. 120 (1967) and Swann v.
Adams, 385 U.S. 443 (1967).
58. 410 U.S. at 341-43.
59. "The validity of these propositions and their applicability to the case before us are
not at all diminished by the fact that Kirkpatrick v. Preisler and Wells v. Rockefeller, 394
U.S. 542 . . . (1969)- two of the many cases in which the propositions were refined and
applied - concerned the division of States into federal congressional districts rather than
legislative reapportionment. Prior to today's decision we have never held that different constitutional standards are applicable to the two situations. True, there are significant differences between congressional districting and legislative apportionment, and we have repeatedly recognized those differences." 410 U.S. at 340 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting
in part).

60. "But language in the Court's opinion today suggests that more may be at stake than
the application of well-established principles to a novel set of facts." Id. at 334. "Prior to
today's decision we have never held that different constitutional standards are applicable to
the two situations." Id. at 340.
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proper state apportionment test,6 1 the dissent noted further shortcomings of
the majority opinion. First, the quantum of proof that established the rationality of Virginia's announced policy of subdivisional representation and the
reasonableness of that policy's effectuation was slight.6 2 The dissent found only
vague references to local legislation without any indication of the extent of
such legislation or the impact of the district court's plan on the general ability
of the subdivisions to seek such legislation.63 Second, before any consideration
may be given to justification, a court must determine that the plan is free from
discrimination or arbitrariness.64 In the instant case, the district court had
found a built-in geographic bias in the House plan: 65 the state's fastest growing area, the Northern Virginia suburbs of 'Washington, D.C., was systemati67
cally under-represented.66 Mr. Justice Brennan commented:
Conveniently, the Court discerns no need even to acknowledge this
critical finding of fact, and sets it aside without explanation. We have
no basis for concluding that the finding is clearly erroneous, and that
finding requires an affirmance of the District Court's decision without
regard to the Commonwealth's asserted justification for the inequalities
in district population.
The instant case departs from the past mathematical precision of the
nearly as practicable standard. This stringent standard, although criticized,68
has nonetheless been effective.6 9 The standard was developed at a time when

61. Id. at 345-50.
62. Id. at 346.
63. "In short, the best that can be said of appellants' efforts to secure county representation is that the plan can be effective only with respect to some unspecified but in all likelihood small number of issues which affect a single county and which are overwhelmingly
important to the voters of that county; and even then it provides effective representation
only where the affected county represents a large enough percentage of the voters in the
district to have a significant impact on the election of the delegate." Id. at 349.
64. See, e.g., Hadley v. Junior College Dist., 397 U.S. 50, 57-58 (1970); Roman v. Sincock.
377 U.S. 695, 710 (1964).
65. 410 U.S. at 344-45.
66. Districts 18, 19, and 20 in Northern Virginia are under-represented by about 5.4%
while districts 39, 43, and 44 in the Tidewater region are over-represented by 4.8%. 330
F. Supp. 1138, 1145 (E.D. Va. 1971). The Commonwealth's average growth rate is 17.2%,
Northern Virginia's is 46%, and the Tidewater region's is about 2%. Id. at 1146.
67. 410 U.S. at 345.
68. "The fact of the matter is that the rule of absolute equality is perfectly compatible
with gerrymandering of the worst sort. A computer may grind out district lines which can
totally frustrate the popular will on an overwhelming number of critical issues." Kirkpatrick
v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 552 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting). See, e.g., Elliott, supra note 36,
where a study of gerrymandering in redistricting during the early 1960's indicates that the
party in power at the time of redistricting gained a large advantage. "If these examples were
representative, they would indicate that the power to gerrymander gave its possessor a crushing 25 per cent advantage over nonpossessors who were also able to secure popular majorities." Id. at 486.
69. For the effect of Reynolds v. Sims on state legislative apportionment, see R. McKAY,
REAPPORTIONMENT 460-75 (1965). For the effect of Wesberry v. Sanders, Preisler v. Secretary
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population malapportionment was rampant and the federal courts were needed
to break the stranglehold that over-represented geographic areas had on state
legislatures. By keeping to a strict population equality standard, the Court
could order reapportionment without wading too deeply into the politics of
representation. Today the task of population apportionment is nearly complete7 0 and perhaps the Supreme Court feels it is time to give the state reapportioner some leeway. Unfortunately, this end was accomplished in the
instant case at the expense of the Northern Virginia voters' franchise.
The instant case and Whitcomb represent a reduction of constitutional
protection for the rights of voters. In Whitcomb, the Court denied a group of
citizens their right to full and effective representation by increasing their
burden of proof. In the instant case, the Court granted effective representation
to an abstract voter, the political subdivision, at the expense of the actual
voter's right to district equality. Hopefully the trend ends here. Nevertheless,
the instant case, as was Reynolds, is a call to future litigation to test the limits
of the new nearly as practicablestandard.
ROBERT

A.
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of State, 279 F. Supp. 952, 992 (W.D. Mo. 1967) (chart), aff'd sub nom., Kirkpatrick v.
Preisler, 594 U.S. 526 (1969).
70. See R. McKAY note 69 supra.
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